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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-o_n analysis of the-h-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation, This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware.
The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance,
navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle
control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC
software. The GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was
performed consists of the following :
o Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)
o Translational Hand Controller (THC)
o Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA)
o Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC)
o Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
o Star Tracker (ST)
o Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS)
o Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA)
o Orbiter Rate Gyro Assembly (ORGA)
o SRB Rate Gyro Assembly (SRGA)
o Accelerometer Assembly (AA)
o Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA)
o Reaction Jet Driver (RJD)
o Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC)
o GNC Function Switches and Circuits
o Power Switches and Circuits
The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware
drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems
briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for
possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned
based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
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Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the sixteen major subdivisions of the GNC subsystem. A
summary of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also
presented below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and
Functional (F) criticality second.
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: 1/l 2/IR 2/2 1 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Number : 3 12 8 1 67 21 30 141
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as fo!lows:_
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Summary of IOA Po£ential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/i I 2/IRNumber : 3 12
2/2
8 3/IRI 1 3/2R
TOTAL
24
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Figure I - GNC OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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Figure 1 - GNC OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY - CONTINUED
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w2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office
has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the
Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
w
S
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GEE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
M
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
w
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
w
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JStep 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
m
g
2.4 GNC Ground Rules and Assumptions
The GNC ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance,
navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle
control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC
software.
The functions of the GNC software can be divided into flight
control, guidance, navigation, hardware data processing, and crew
display. The specific tasks of each function, as well as the GNC
hardware used to support them, vary with mission phase.
Figure 2 is an overview of the GNC hardware for which failure
modes analysis was performed. For the analysis, the hardware was
divided into the following three categories:
I • MAJOR COMPONENTS (BLACK BOXES) - This category includes
the sensors, manual controllers, and effector inter-
faces listed below:
(1) RHC (8) ADTA
(2) THC (9) RGA (ORB)
(3) RPTA (i0) RGA (SRB)
(4) SBTC (11) AA
(5) IMU (12) ASA
(6) ST (13) RJD
(7) COAS (14) ATVC
Figures 3 - 16 provide a hardware breakdown of each of
the above components.
II. FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - This category consists
of switches/clrcuits whose primary purpose is to select
a particular mode of operation for the GNC software.
Twelve groups were identified and are listed below:
(i) TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT SWs
(2) TRIM SWs
(3) TRIM ON/OFF SWs
(4) SENSE -Z/-X SW
(5) P,R/Y CSS/AUTO PBIs
(6) SPD BK/THROT PBIs
(7) BODY FLAP CNTL CKT
(8) ATT REF PBI
(9) ENTRY MODE SW CKT
(i0) ABORT MODE CKT
(ii) DAP PBIs
(12) FCS CHNL CNTL CKT
gIII. POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - This Category consists of
groups 0f Switches/circuits that provide electrical
power to the major components and Flight Control System
(FCS) annunciator lamps• Twelve groups were
identified and are listed below:
(i) FLT CNTLR PWR CKT
(2) IMU PWR CKT
(3) ST PWR CKT
(4) COAS PWR CKT
(5) ADTA PWR CKT
(6) RGA (ORB) PWR CKT
(7) RGA (SRB)+ p WR CKT
(8) AA PWR CKT
(9) ASA PWR CKT
(i0) RJD PWR CKT
(ii) ATVC PWR CKT
(12) FCS SW ANNUN CKT
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A brief description of the major components _nd functi0n switches
and circuits is provided-below.
i • Three RHCs, two forward and one aft t p_ovide manual
attitude control. _ ....._ .....
•
•
Two THCs, one at the CDRs station and one aft, provide
manual translation control with the use of the RCS system.
Two RPTAs, one connected to the CDRs pedals and one to the
PLTs, send rudder and nose wheel steering commands to the
GPCs.
• Two SBTCs, one at the CDRs station and one at the PLTs,
control the speed brake during entry• The pilot's SBTC can
also be used for main engine throttle control during ascent.
, Three IMUs, attached to the NAV base, provide acceleration
and attitude data to the GPCs,
. Two STs, mounted on the NAV base, are used to align the IMUs
and to provide line of site vectors during rendezvous
missions•
.....7_ +One q0_ that can be mounted at the CDRs station or the aft
station is a backup to the STs for use in IMU alignment.
. Four ADTAs, located in the forward avionics bay, provide
pressure data to the GPCs. This data is used during entry
to calculate angle of attack, relative speed, mach number,
and barometric altitude.
, Four orbiter RGAs, mounted at the bottom of the aft
bulkhead, provide attitude rates about each body axis to
flight control for stability augmentation during ascent and
entry. The RGAs also drive the rate needles of the ADIs
during ascent.
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10. Four SRB RGAs, two on the ieft and two on the right SRB,
provide pitch and yaw rates to flight control to assist in
SRB TVC and to provide stability augmentation during ascent
until SRB separation.
ii. Four AAs, located in the forward avionics bays, measure
normal and lateral body acceleration for use in flight
control to provide stability augmentation during ascent and
entry.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Four ASAs, located in the aft avionics bays, derive aerosur-
face actuator position error commands and perform fault
detection.
Four RJDs, two forward and two aft, in response to flight
control commands, send signals to open/close the oxidizer
and fuel valves associated with each RCS jet.
Four ATVCs, located in the aft avionics bays, provide SRB
and main engine gimbal control for slewing engine bells
prior to liftoff, gimbaling engines to control trajectory
during flight, positioning the main engines to a dump
position, and stow position.
Two TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT switches, CDRs and PLTs, allow the
software to accept or reject trim commands from the panel
trim switches and the RHC trim switches.
Six TRIM switches, a roll, pitch, yaw set at the CDRs and
PLTs station, allow the crew to make small changes in the
vehicles attitude via commands to the aerosNrfaces.
Two panel TRIM ON/OFF switches, CDRs and PLTs, provide power
to the associated TRIM switches when in the "ON" position.
One SENSE -Z/-X switch located on the aft panel A6, is used
onorbit to make the aft RHC, THC, and ADI correspond to the
line of sight.
Two sets of PITCH, ROLL/YAW CSS/AUTO PBIs exist (eight
switches total) that allow the CDR or PLT to select auto or
manual (CSS) attitude control during ascent and entry.
Two SPD BK/THROT PBIs, CDRs and PLTs station, allow the crew
to switch to auto from manual throttle control during ascent
and to auto or manual speed brake control during entry.
The BODY FLAP CONTROL CIRCUIT consists of two BODY FLAP
UP/DOWN switches and two BODY FLAP AUTO/MANUAL PBIs that
allow manual or auto control from either the CDRs or PLTs
station.
9
w22.
23.
24.
25
26.
Three ATT REF PBIs, located at the CDRs, PLTs, and aft crew
stations, allow the crew to select a reference frame from
which attitude errors will be displayed on the three
Attitude Direction Indicators (ADI). The ATT REF PBI is
also used to take "marks" when the COAS is used for IMU
alignment.
The ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT provides capability for the
crew to change DAP control modes during entry via the ENTRY
MODE switch.
The ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT provides capability for the
crew to select and initiate an abort mode during ascent via
the ABORT MODE ROTARY switch and the ABORT push button.
Forty eight DAP PBIs (24 f-wd and 24 aft) provide crew
flexibility in selecting translational and rotational
control options with the ONORBIT and TRANS DAPS.
Four FCS CHANNEL CONTROL CIRCUITS provide power and control
to one of four ASAs and ATVCs via the four FCS CHANNEL
switches on panel C3 .....
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The GNC hardware is located throughout the orbiter' The precise
location for each component/switch/clrcuit is provided on the
analysis worksheets in Appendix C.
The GNC hardware is interfaced with the software via the flight
critical MDMs. Switch and power status is monitored via the
flight critical MDMs and operational instrumentation.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of the GNC into its hardware
components, and Figures 3 - 16 are the detailed systems
representations.
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Figure 3 - GNC ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER (RHC)
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Figure 4 GNC TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
13
(THC )
i>-
U.J
_9
z
CD
,7
R
I
D
u
mm
g
m
mm
l
m
m
i
i
l
mm
Figure
=
5 - GNC RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
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Figure 6 - GNC SPEED BRAKE THRUST CONTROLLER (SBTC)
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Figure 7 - GNC INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT (IMU)
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Figure 9 - GNC CREW OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SITE (COAS)
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Figure I0 - GNC AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA)
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Figure ii - GNC ORBITER RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY (ORGA)
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Figure 12 - GNC SRB RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY (SRGA)
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Figure 13 - GNC ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY (AA)
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Figure 14 - GNC AEROSURFACE
23
SERVO AMPLIFIER (ASA)
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m4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
The GNC analysis was divided into the following three categories:
I. MAJOR COMPONENTS (BLACK BOXES)
II. FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - primary purpose is to
select a particular mode of operation for the GNC software.
III. POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - these provide electrical power
to the GNC major components and DAP annunciation lamps.
Table I summarizes the total number of identified failure modes
and their criticalities. Table II Summarizes the total number of
PCIs.
+ ........ +
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Table I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
--nwm
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
Number : 3 12 8 67 21 141I 3/330
z
l
B
Table II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number I 1/13 I 2/IR I 2/2 3/IR12 8 1
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
24
mm
i
The three categories are summarized below, with the detailed
analysis results for each of the identified failure modes
presented in Appendix C.
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4.1 ANALYSIS RESULTS - GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS
Fourteen components were included in this category. Table III
lists the components and summarizes the failure mode
criticalities for each component. Table IV summarizes the number
of PCIs for this category.
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TABLE III GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
1. RHC
2. THC
3. RPTA
4. SBTC
5. IMU
6. ST
7. COAS
8. ADTA
9. RGA (ORB)
i0. RGA (SRB)
2/IR 3/1R
ii. AA
12. ASA
13. RJD
14. ATVC
i/I
1
2
1
1
1
m
m
2
- 2
- 7
- 4
- 3
- 36
w
1
2
2/2
2
1
3
4
l*
2
1
2
2
2
3/2R 3/3
2
m
1
i u
TOTAL 2 9 - 3 50
TOTAL
5
3
4
5
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
8
6
5
*PCI due to Screen C failure.
_m
TABLE IV GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: I i/iNumber : 2
P ...... _ .......
2/IR
9
2/2
3/IRI I 3/2R
-+
I TOTAL12
27
R4.2 ANALYSIS RESULTS - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Twelve groups of switches and circuits make up this category.
Table v lists the individual groups and summarizes the failure
mode criticalities for each. Table VI summarizes the number of
PCIs for this category.
U
m
TABLE V GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
i. TRIM ENABLE
INHIB SW'S
2. TRIM SW'S
3. TRIM ON/OFF
SW'S
4. SENSE -Z/-X
SW
5. P,R/Y CSS/
AUTO PBI'S
6. SPD BK/THROT
PBI
7. BODY FLAP
CNTL CKT
8. ATT REF PBI
9. ENTRY MODE
SW
10. ABORT MODE
CKT
ii. DAP PBI'S
12. FCS CHNL
CNTL CKT
TOTAL
i/! 2/IR
2
2/2
8
3/1R
2
1
2
w
1
14
3/2R
1
20
m
21
3/3
2
i0
TOTAL
2
2
5
29
3
57
R
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uTABLE VI GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS .
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CritlcalitY:JlJll2JiRJ2 2 ober; l 3 8 3/IR
m
3/2R_ I TOTAL12
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i4.3 ANALYSIS RESULTS - GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Twelve groups of switches and circuits make up this category.
Table VII lists the individual groups and summarizes the failure
mode criticalities for each group. Table VIII summarizes the
number of PCIs for this category.
l
m
TABLE VII GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
i. FLT CNTLR
PWR CKT
2. IMU PWR CKT
3. ST PWR CKT
4. COAS PWR CKT
5. ADTA PWR CKT
6. RGA (ORB)
PWR CKT
7. AA PWR CKT
8. ASA PWR CKT
9. RJD PWR CKT
i0. ATVC PWR
CKT
ii. FCS SW
ANNUN CKT
12. RGA (SRB)
PWR CKT
--w
TOTAL
1/l 2/IR
E
2/2 3/1R
1
2
2
1
3
17
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
1 2
! 3
1 3
3 3
2 3
- 3
2 4
1 2
2 4
1 2
2 3
1 2
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TABLE VIII GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: ] i/I
Number : - 2/IR_ I 2/2
3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
z
L
u
r__
um_
4.4
•
2.
3.
4.
•
6.
7.
8.
,
I0.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
LIST OF MDAC ANALYSIS WORKSHEET IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
ITEM
RHC
FLT CNTLR PWR CKT
TRIM ENABLE INHIBIT SWS
TRIM SWs
TRIM 0N/OFF SWs
SENSE -Z/-X SW
P,R/Y CSS/AUTO PBIs
THC
RPTA
SBTC
SPD BK/THROT PBI
IMU
IMU PWR CKT
ST
ST PWR CKT
COAS
COAS PWR CKT
ADTA
ADTA PWR CKT
RGA (ORB)
RGA (ORB) PWR CKT
RGA (SRB)
RGA (SRB) PWR CKT
AA
AA PWR CKT
ASA
FCS CHNL CNTL CKT
ASA PWR CKT
RJD
RJD PWR CKT
ATVC
ATVC PWR CKT
BODY FLAP CNTL CKT
DAP PBIs
FCS SW ANNUN CKT
ENTRY MODE SW
ABORT MODE CKT
ATT REF PB
MDAC ID 'S
i01 - 105
ii0 - Iii
120 - 121
130 - 131
140 - 141
150 - 151
160 - 161
201 - 203
301 - 304
401 - 405
410 - 411
501 - 502
510 - 512
601 - 602
610 - 612
701 - 702
710 - 712
801 - 8O2
810 - 812
901 - 902
903 - 905
950 - 951
960 - 961
i001 - 1002
i010 - 1013
ii01 - 1108
iii0 - 1112
1130 - 1131
1201 - 1208
1211 - 1214
1301 - 1305
1310 - 1311
1400 - 1404
1501 - 1586
1590 - 1593
1601 - 1602
1801 - 1804
1901 - 1902
__ 31
5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
I. JSC-18863, Guidance and Control Systems Briefs, 9-30-85
2. CONT 2102, Controllers workbook, 2-1-82
3. GNC HS OV 2102, GNC Hardware/Software Overview, 5-17-84
4. JSC-12820, STS operational Flight Rules, PCN-I, 2-14-86
5. VS70-971099, Integrated System Schematic - GNC & Data
Processing, 0v-099 & OV-103, 4-11-86
6. VS70-790129, Schematic Diagram - Rotational Hand
Controller, 10-22-80
7. VS70-790159, Schematic Diagram - Translational Hand
Controller, 1-14-81
8. VS70-790149, Schematic Diagram - Rudder Pedal Transducer
Assembly, 1-12-81
9. VS70-971099, Schematic Diagram - Speed Brake Thrust
Controller, 11-17-80
i0. VS70-710109, Schematic Diagram, Inertial Measurement
Unit, i1-12-80
ii. VS70-710149, Schematic Diagram, Star Tracker, 11-18-80
12. VS70-590309, Schematic Diagram, Air Data Probe Deployment
and Heater, 11-12-80
13. VS70-710152, Schematic Diagram, Orbiter Rate Gyro &
Navigation Subsystem, 3-24-75
14 VS70C790119, Schematic Diagram, Acceierometer Assembly,
10-30-80
15. VS70-790229, Schematic Diagram, Aerosurface Servo Amplfier,
12-10"80
16. VS70-420109,209,309, Schematic Diagram, RCS Fwd, Aft
Right, & Aft Left Modules, March 1980
17. VS70-790239, Schematic Diagram, Ascent Thrust Vector
Control-Fit Control Subsystem, 3-18-81
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ACA
A/D -
ADI
ADTA -
AID -
ALC -
AOA -
APC -
ASA -
ATO -
ATVC -
BF
BFS -
BITE -
CB
CIL -
CKT -
CNTLR -
COAS -
CRIT -
CRT
CSS -
C&W -
DAP -
DDU -
DEU -
DISC -
DPS -
DU
EIU -
EVA -
FA
FCOS -
FCS -
FDIR -
FF
FM
FMEA -
FSM -
FSSR -
FSW -
FUNC -
GPC -
GSE -
H/W -
IMU -
IOA -
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
Accelerometer Assembly
Annunciator Control Assembly
Analog to Digital
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Analog Input Differential
Aft Load Controller
Abort Once Around
Aft Power Controller
Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
Abort To Orbit
Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Body Flap
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
Circuit Breaker
Critical Items List
Circuit
Controller
Crew Optical Alignment Sight
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Control Stick Steering
Caution and Warning System
Digital Auto Pilot
Display Driver Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Discrete
Data Processing System
Display Unit
Engine Interface Unit
Extra vehicular Activity
Flight Aft
Flight Control Operating System
Flight Control System
Fault Detection, Identification, Reconfiguration
Flight Forward
Failure Mode
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Summary Message
Functional Subsystem Software Requirements
Flight Software
Function
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hardware
Inertial Measurement Unit
Independent Orbiter Assessment
A-I
w
LF
LL
LPS -
LR
LRU -
MAN -
MC
MCC -
MCDS -
MDAC -
MDM -
MEC -
MM
MSK -
MVS -
NA
NASA -
NORM -
NSTS -
OA
OF
OMRSD -
OMS
OPS -
p
PBI -
PCI -
PCM -
POS -
R
RCS -
RGA -
RHC -
RI
RJD -
RM
ROT -
RPC -
RPTA -
RS
RTLS -
SBTC -
SF
SM
SOP -
SRB -
SSME -
ST
STS -
SW
S/W -
Launch Forward
Launch Left
Launch Processing System
Launch Right
Line Replaceable Unit
Manual
Memory Configuration
Mission Control Center ....................
Multifunction CRT Display System
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Main Engine Controller
Major Mode
Manual Select Keyboard
Mid Value Select
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Normal
National Space Transportation System
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operational Sequence
Pitch
Pushbutton Indicator
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
Position
Roll
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Assembly
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Reaction Jet Driver
Redundancy Management
Rotation
Remote Power Controller
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
Redundant Set
Return To Landing Site
Speed Brake Thrust Controller
Selection Filter
Systems Management
Subsystem Operating Program
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Star Tracker
Space Transportation System
Switch
Software
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TD
THC -
TRANS -
TVC -
VDC -
VERN -
y
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Touch Down
Translational Hand Controller
Translation
Thrust Vector Control
volts Direct Current
Vernier
Yaw
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D
i
g
m
I
U
m
m
B-I ..
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
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B.I Definitions
, ForDefinitions contained in NSTS 22206 Instructions __ Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 19_[ were used with the following
a-mplifications and additYons.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_$6--OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to oPs 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
r_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m---_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
pa-I_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc. )
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDERFAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
causeo-----_ ev--_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSIO N OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal £o mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up 'an_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio--n-_t of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at ra_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and e_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
n
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL_ 10--_ober 1986, was employe--_-with the
foliowing amp-[ifications and addition--_.
i •
2.
3.
4.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
, All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
_ B-4
m.
.
•
•
I0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
GNC - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The failure analyses wili beconducted to the black box
level for components whose output serves only one function
unless a lower level is required to be consistent with the
existing FMEAs.
RATIONALE: The definition credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
For black boxes whose output serves more than one function,
the analysis will go to a level that effects each of the
different functions.
RATIONALE: The defined credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
Credible failure modes for most black boxes are defined to
be
(I) No output
(2) Erroneous output (Output that redundancy management
will detect as a failure.)
(3) Premature output (Output occurs without command. This
may not be credible for all black boxes.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function.
Credible failures for switches are defined to be
(i) Fails on (Power cannot be shut off by switch.)
(2) Fails off (Power cannot be turned on.)
(3) Short to ground
(4) Internal short (Short across switch contacts.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function.
Power circuits analysis does not include the resistors that
reside between the power circuit and a MDM.
RATIONALE: These resistors provide signal conditioning
for the MDM and are not a part of the power
circuit.
_ B-6
mAPPENDIX C
DETAILE_ ANAL YS TS _
This sectioncontainsthe IOA analysis-worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
_-6-_to-_f--6ach sheet?-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top. _ _.....
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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Hardware Criticalities:
! - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
......i_ - Redund_n-£_hardware items' (f_ _r_unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight ......
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens Band C: _
P = Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA _ Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: i01 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHC
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF CNTL STICK
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RHC
s)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73A5,A6,A7
MC621-0043-3046
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECH SHOCK, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 RED RHC FUNCTION. 2 FWD AND 1 AFT RHC'S.
OPS-2 IFM ALLOWS REPLACEMENT OF RHC'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/ii/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHC
NO XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RHC
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORB IT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 30V73A5, A6, A7
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3046
CAUSES: LOSS OF EXCITATION VOLTAGE,TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE:LOSS OF i OF 3 REDUNDANT CHANNELS.
2 FWD AND 1 AFT RHC'S. OPS-2 IFM ALLOWS REPLACEMENT OF RHC'S.
REFERENCES:
w
I
U
mm
B
mm
u
J
U
g
m
L_
mm
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-3
mmm
=E =
.==
w
E
w
L--
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 103 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHC
ERRONEOUS XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) RHC
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73AS,A6,A7
MC621-0043-3046
CAUSES: XDCR CIRCUIT FAILURE, VIBR, TEMP.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE:LOSS OF 1 OF 3 REDUNDANT _CHANNE_. _
2 FWD AND 1 AFT RHC'S. OPS-2 IFM ALLOWS REPLACEMENT OF RHC'S.
REFERENCES:
F
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT:
HDW/FL_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RHC
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ON A TRIM SW CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RHC
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73A5,A6,A7
MC621-0043-3046
CAUSES: SW CONT FAILED OPEN, SW SHORTED TO GROUND.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRIM SW FUNCTION (BY AXIS). PNL AND RHC TRIM SW'S.
LOSS OF TRIM SW FUNCTION CAUSES SOME IN--CR_fN CREW WO_AD,
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 105 ABORT:
ITEM: RHC
FAILURE MODE: TRIM SW CHN FAILS ON.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RHC
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: 30V73A5, A6, A7
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3046
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACTS SHORTED ( VIBR, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 2 SW CONT'S ( REDUNDANT CHN'S ) FAILED ON.
TRIM SW CMD ONWITH 2 C_'S ?LD ON, _ PNL TRIM SW TO INHIBIT.
REFERENCES:
C-6
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: II0
ITEM: CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
FAILURE MODE: CB OR SW FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) RHC, SBTC, RPTA, THC
3) FLT CNTLR PWR CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
....CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 _
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL FTASS2, FSASS1, A6AIS2. CB'S: PNL O14
CB30, 31, O15 CB29, 30, O16 CB22, 23.
PART NUMBER: SWtS (ME452-0102-7352), CB'S (MC454-0026-2075).
CAUSES: CB OR SW CONTACTS SHORTED INTEPd_ALLY (CONTAMINATION,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :_i_i_i_i_T_
NONE: IF 1 OF 3 OR ALL SW CHN'S FL ON, CNTLR PWR CAN BE _URNED
OFF ON ALL 3 CHN'S BY THE 2 REDUNDANT CB'S. IF 1 OF 2 CB'S FL ON,
CNTLR POWER CAN BE TURNED OFF WITH THE CNTLR SWITCH.
THIS IS TRUE FOR THE LEFT, RIGHT, AND AFT CNTLR PWR CIRCUIT. B-
SCREEN: MCC HAS SUFFICIENT DATA DISPLAYED TO MONITOR THE CNTLR
PWR STATUS. POWER FAILED ON MAY EFFECT POWER CONSUMABLES AND
MISSION LENGTH.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
CB OR SW FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DP_PEIA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
GNC
RHC, SBTC, RPTA, THC
FLT CNTLR PWR CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION: SW'S: PNL FVASS2, FSA8S1, A6AIS2. CB'S: PNL O14
CB30, 31, 015 CB29, 30, 016 CB22, 23.
PART NUMBER: SW'S (ME452-0102-7352), CB'S (MC454-0026-2075).
CAUSES: coNT_INATION, VIBRI_PIEcE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE: 1 SW CHN FL OPEN, WILL REMOVE PWR FROM ONLY 1 CNTLR CHN.
ALL 3 SW CHN'S FL OPEN WILL REMOVE PWR FROM ALL 3 CNTLR CHN'S.
THIS PERTAINS TO BOTH LFT, RT, AFT CNTLR PWR CIRCUITS.
2_ CB'S _FL OPEN/_ WILL REMOVE PWR-_OM ALL CNTLR CHN'S. THIS
PERTAINS TO BOTH LFT, RT, AFT CNTLR PWR CIRCUIT. B-SCREEN: MCC
HAS SUFFICIENT DATA DIPLAYED TO MONITOR THE CNTLR PWR STATUS.
REFERENCES :
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 120 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED (INHIBIT POSITION).
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA_L: 3/3
O_ORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/5
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F3 $2, $4. RESISTORS: PNL F6 AI2R7, RI5,
F8 AI2R8, RI7. ............
PART NUMBER: SW'S (ME452-0102-7201), RESISTORS (RWR80S1211FR).
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ _ ...._ ...........
NONE: i OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAILED ON. 2 CONTACTS FAILED ON WILL
INHIBIT TRIM. TRIM CAN BE PERFORMED FROM THE OTHER CREWMEMBER'S
POSITION. _
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TE_METRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT SWITCH
- CRITICALiT_ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F3 $2, $4. RESISTORS: PNL F6 A12R7, R15,
F8 AI2R8, RI7.
PART NUMBER: SW'S (ME452-0102-7201), RESISTORS (RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATiONAl:
NONE: 1 OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAILED OFF WILL RESULT IN INHIBIT
SWITCH DISAGREE (TRIM ENABLE). PNL TRIM SWITCHES CAN BE POWERED
OFF WITH PWR ON/OFF SWITCHES.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
313
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) TRIM SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
C3 A7S5.
PART NUMBER:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
SW'S: PNL L2 AIS8, $9, $10. PNLPC_ KISIS, Si6. PNL
SW'S: (ME452-0102-7205).
CAUSES: SW CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONA_i _-_ ...........
NONE: 1 OF 2 Sq_ C_NTACTS (C_) ?AILED ON. 2 CONT_CTS FAILED ON
WILL TURN TRIM ON. PNL TRIM SW'S CAN BE POWERED OFF WITH PWR
ON/OFF SWITCHES. TRIM SWITCHES ARE USED TO DECREASE CREW
WORKLOAD • _......... -.........................._ ....__ '_ .......
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 131 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) TRIM SWITCH
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
C3 A7S5.
PART NUMBER:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
SW'S: PNL L2 AIS8, $9, SI0. PNL C3 AISIS, S16. PNL
SW'S: (ME452-0102-7205).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS (CHN) FAILED OFF WILL RESULT IN TRIM
SWITCH DISAGREE STATE. TRIM CAN BE PERFORMED FROM THE OTHER
CREWMEMBER'S POSITION. TRIM SWITCHES ARE USED TO DECREASE CREW
WORKLOAD.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 140 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ON/OFF
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
D
m
mm
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC u
2) TRIM ON/OFF SWITCH
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 T_L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F3 $3, $5. RESISTORS: PNL F6 AI2RS, RI6.
PNL F8 AI2R9, RI8.
PART NUMBER: SW'S (ME452-0102-7201), RESISTORS (RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAILED ON. 2 CONTACTS FAILED ON WILL
ACTIVATE THE CORRESPONDING TRIM SWITCH OUTPUT. TRIM SWITCH OUTPUT
CAN BE INHIBITED FROM PANEL INHIBIT SWITCH.
TRIM SWITCH OUTPUT MEASUREMENTS CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE POWER
SWITCH STATUS.
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 141 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ON/OFF
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) TRIM ON/OFF SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F3 $3, $5. RESISTORS: PNL F6 AI2R8, RI6.
PNL F8 AI2R9, RI8.
PART NUMBER: SW'S (ME452-0102-7201), RESISTORS (RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OFF WILL RESULT IN TRIM SWITCH
DISAGREE STATE. TRIM CAN BE PERFORMED FROM THE OTHER CREWMAN'S
POSITION.
TRIM SWITCH OUTPUT MEASUREMENTS CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE POWER
SWITCH STATUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 150 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-SENSE
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: ESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SENSE SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
A6R3.
PART NUMBER:
SW'S: PNL A6 SI. RESISTORS: PNL A6AI A6RI, A6R2,
SW: (ME452-0102-7301), RESISTORS (RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE ).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAI_D ON, RM WILL FAIL CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT POSITION. SWITCH DEFAULT POSITION IS -Z.
LOSS OF SENSE SWITCH FUNCTION MAY INCREASE ONORBIT CREW WORKLOAD
AND MISSION COMPLEXITY. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY
DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 151 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH-SENSE
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SENSE SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_ _ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL A6 SI. RESISTORS: PNL A6AI A6RI, A6R2,
A6R3.
PART NUMBER: SW: (ME452-0102-7301), RESISTORS (RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED OFF, RM WILL FAIL CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2"LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT POSITION. SWITCH DEFAULT POSITION IS -Z.
LOSS OF SENSE SWITCH FUNCTION MAY INCREASE ONORBIT CREW WORKLOAD
AND MISSION COMPLEXITY. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY
DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
C-16REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO SWITCH
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORB IT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F2 $2, $3, $5, $6. PNL F4 $2, $3, $5, $6.
REF DWG VS70-790209.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0061-7141 & 7142). RESISTORS
(RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: SWI_CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINAION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED ON, RM WILL FAIL CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT POSITION. IF AUTO POSITION FAILED ON, MANUAL OVERRIDE
POSSIBLE IF CSS HELD DEPRESSED. NO OVERRIDE FOR CSS FAIL ON.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM STATUS'
?
REFERENCES:
mm
m
l
D
D
m
B
-- i
i
B
I
M
D
i
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-17
m
m
W
ww
u
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 161 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO SWITCH
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: SWIS: PNL F2 $2, $3, $5, $6. PNL F4 $2, $3, $5, $6.
REF DWG VS70-790209.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0061-7141 & 7142). RESISTORS
(RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED OFF, RM WILL FAIL CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT POSITION. AUTO/CSS CAN BE SELECTED FROM THE OTHER
CREWMEMBER'S POSITION.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
C-18REPORT DATE 12/23/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/05/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: THC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) THC
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ]
PNL F5 & A6
MC621-0043-3140
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: TEMP., VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART FAIL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. 3LVL REDUNDANT CHANNEL; RESLECTABLE BY CREW
NONE. IN FLIGHT MAINTENANCE ALLOWS INTERCHANGE OF THC'S
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDE;ENDE ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
9/10/86
GNC
202
THC
IMMOBILE THC
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDw/FUNc
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H' SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) THC
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDWIFUNC
2/1R
211R
211R
2/IR
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F5 & A6
MC621-0043-3140
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OTHER THC AVAILABLE - ONORBIT ONLY. MANUAL - Z TRANSLATION FOR
ET SEP INHIBITED - MAY CAUSE VEHICLE DAMAGE.
IN FLIGHT MAINTENANCE ALLOWS INTERCHANGE OF THC'S
REFERENCES:
C-20REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: THC
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) THC
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F5 & A6
MC621-0043-3140
CAUSES: TEMP., VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART FAIL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. RM USE MAJORITY VOTE SCHEME.
NONE. CAPABILITY TO SEL/DES VIA KEYBOARD ....
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 301 ABORT:
_DW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPTA
NO OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RPTA
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
FLIG}IT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/nmc ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
A[ 2 ] B[P]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
c[P]
LOCATION: 30V73A14, AI5
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES : ELECTRICAL SHORT, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT- FDIR WILL DOWNMODE THE SF TO 2-LEVELAND AVERAGE THE
VALUES TO PRODUCE A GOOD OUTPUT.THE OTHER RPTA SF USES MVS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPTA
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RPTA
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: 30V73AI4,AI5
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL SHORT,VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT- FDIR WILL DOWNMODE THE SF TO 2-LEVELAND AVERAGE THE
VALUES TO PRODUCE A GOOD OUTPUT.THE OTHER RPTA SF USES MVS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPTA
INADVERTENT OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GNC
2) RPTA
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
....CRITICALIT!ES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73AI4,AI5
MC621-0043-3440
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT- FDIR WILL DOWNMODE THE SF TO 2-LEVELAND AVERAGE THE
VALUES TO PRODUCE A GOOD OUTPUT.THE OTHER RPTA SF USES MVS.
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: RPTA
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RPTA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3
01_01_BIT: _ 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
CRITICALZTIES
HDW/nmC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
- AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T _MBER:
30V73A14,A15
MC621-004S-3440
CAUSES: FAILURE OF THE MECHANICAL ARM INTERACTION WITH THE RPTA
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAVES_ON___RpTA (3C_NELS)-THISIS ADEQUATE_.BUT IF DETECTED
EARLY IN THE MISSION,COULD FORCE A EARLY RETURN ......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 401 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SBTC
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF CNTLLEVER
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICAL ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL L2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3).
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3240
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECH SHOCK, MISHANDLING,VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PLT SBTC MAN THRUST FUNCTION LOST,BACKUP FOR AUTO MODE.
LOST 1 OF 2 SBTC SPD BRK CMD FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
C-26REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: SBTC
FAILURE MODE: NO XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: pNL L 2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3). _:
PART _BER: MC621-0043-3240
CAUSES: LOSS OF EXCITATION VOLTAGE,XDCR CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE:FOR PLT MAN THRUST FUNCTION, IST FL IS AUTO GUID DOWNMODE.
NONE:THE SPD BRK CMD FUNCT USES CDR(PLT) PNL L2(C3) SBTC'S.
REFERENCES:
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IND'.PENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SBTC
ERRONEOUS XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT OUDONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL L2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3).
MC621-0043-3240
CAUSES: XDCR CIRCUIT FAILURE,VTBR, TEMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE:FOR PLT MAN THRUST FUNCTION, IST FL IS AUTO GUID DOWNMODE.
NONE:THE SPD BRK CMD FUNCT USES CDR(PLT) PNL L2(C3) SBTC'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: SBTC
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ON A TAKEOVER SW CHN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL L2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3).
MC621-0043-3240
CAUSES: SW CONT FAILED OPEN, SW SHORTED TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE:PLT MAN THRUST TAKEOVER, IST FL IS AUTO GUID DOWNMODE.
NONE:SPD BRK CMD TAKEOVER USES CDR(PLT) PNL L2(C3) SBTC'S. ......
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: SBTC
FAILURE MODE: TAKEOVER SW CHN FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL L2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3).
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3240
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACTS SHORTED(VIBR, MECH SHOCK, CONTAMINATION)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PLT MAN THRUST TAKEOVER, 1ST FAILURE IS THE NEED FOR DOWNMODE
FROM AUTO TO MANUAL. IF PLT'S SBTC TAKEOVER SWITCH FAILS ON
DURING ASCENT, THERE IS NO RECOVERY FROM MANUAL THRUST TAKEOVER.
SPD BRK CMD TAKEOVER USES CDR & PLT SBTC'S. IF PLT'S TAKEOVER SW
FLS ON DURING ENTRY, PLT HAS MAN CNTL ONLY AND CDR IS IN AUTO
UNLESS HE HOLDS IN THE TAKEOVER SW. IF CDR'S TAKEOVER SW FLS ON
DURING ENTRY, CDR REMAINS IN MAN AND PLT REMAINS IN AUTO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 410 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH-SPD BK/THROT PBI
SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
l
m
m
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC ..
2) SBTC
3) SPD BK/THROT PBI SWITCH
4)
s) ,-
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F2 $8, F4 $8. RESISTORS: F6 AI2R6, RI4,
R22. F8 AI2RT, RI6, R24.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS (RWRSOSI211FR).
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE: FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED ON, RM WILL FAIL THE CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT SW. IF SW FAILS ON (AUTO MODE), SBTC TAKEOVER SW HELD
WILL OVERRIDE AUTO. _
IF SBTC TAKEOVER SWITCH FAILS FROM_Ud_UAL MODE BY
THE SPD BK/THROT PBI AUTO SWITCH. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE
TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DIPLAYED IN THE MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM
STATUS.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 411 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH-SPD BK/THROT PBI
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SBTC
3) SPD BK/THROT PBI SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: SW'S: PNL F2 $8, F4 $8. RESISTORS: F6 AI2R6, RI4,
R22. F8 AI2R7, RI6, R24.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS (RWRSOSI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED OFF. RM WILL FAIL CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THAT POSITION. AUTO MODE CAN BE SELECTED FROM THE OTHER
CREWMEMBER'S POSITION.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DIPLAYED IN THE
MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: IMU
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) IMU
S)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V7 IAI3,30V7 IAI4,30V7 IAI5
MC409-0004-0010
CAUSE_" SEE ATTACHMENT 501
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RM WILL DETECT (FDI, BITE, COMMFAULT) THE FIRST FAILURE AND
DESELECT THE FAILED IMU. RM MIGHT NOT IsO_TE A SECOND FAILURE
IF THE FAILURE LIES ON THE LINE OF AMBIGUITY, CAUSING LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: IMU
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) IMU
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A[ I] B [P] C [ F]
30V71AI3,30V71AI4,30VTIAI5
MC409-0004-0010
CAUSES: INTERNAL POWER SUPPLY FAILURE -
CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK,LOSS OF IMPROPER
INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT FOR PASS S/W, IMU'S ARE TRIPLE REDUNDANT-FAILED IMU
WILL BE DESELECTED (FDI,COMM FAULT, BITE) BY RM.
NO EFFECT FOR BFS S/W, IMU'S ARE TRIPLE REDUNDANT-FAILED IMU WILL
BE DESELECTED (COMM FAULT, BITE, MCC) BY BFS OR CREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/iR
MDAC ID: Sl0 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IMUPOWER CIRCUIT
ONE BRANCH OF CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
I
m
l
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!) GNC i.
2) IMU
3) IMU POWER CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
SI0,SII,RPC5,RPC6,RPC7,A4RI,A4R2,A5RI,A5R2,CRII,CRI2,CR20,CR21,
CR27,CR28-PNL014,PNL015,PNL016
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201,MC450-0017-
2100,RWR80SI211FR,JANTXIN!88R
CAUSES: RESISTOR (RWRSOSI211FR) SHORTED TO GROUND, ONE SWITCH
CONTACT(ME452-0102-7201) FAILED OPEN, RPC (MC450-0017-2100)
FAILED OPEN, DIODE (JANTXINI88R) FAILED OPEN -
CONTAMINATION,VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATI6NALE:
NONE - POWER WILL BE SUPPLIED TO THE IMU THROUGH THE OTHER BRANCH
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IMU POWER CIRCUIT
POWER CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) IMU
3) IMU POWER CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SI0,SII-PNL014,PNL015,PNL016
ME452-0102-7201
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/ZR
3/IR
c[P]
CAUSES: POWER SWTICH JAMMED - PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE IMU - 2 REMAINING IMU'S ARE SUFFICIENT TO PERFORM THE
MISSION
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 512 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IMU POWER CIRCUIT
1 CIRCUIT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
Bmm
U
nm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC ..
2) IMU
3) IMU POWER CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A IN/A] B [N/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION:
P_T_MBER:
SI0,SII,RPCS,RPC6,RPCT-PNL014,PNL015,PNL016
ME452_0102QT_0i,MC450_0017_2100 ....
CAUSES: SWITCH OR RPC FAILURE - VIBRATION,MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILtWRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
iMU _OT BE POWERED OFF - POSSIBLE POWER CONSUMPTION PROBLEM _
E
ms
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASS_.SSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/22/86
GNC
601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STAR TRACKER
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) STAR TRACKER
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
10V71A7 (-Y) ,A6 (-Z)
MC431-0128-0012
CAUSES: SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILED, IMAGE DISSECTOR TUBE (IDT)
FAILED,ST DOOR FAILED CLOSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ST IS NOT CRITICAL- REDUNDANCY REMAINS WITH THE OTHER
ST AND COAS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 602 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: STAR TRACKER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) STAR TRACKER
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 10V7 IA7 (-Y) ,A6 (-Z)
PART NUMBER: MC431-0128-0012
CAUSES: LENS DEGRADATION,FOCUS FIELD CIRCUIT SHORTED, SHORT IN
DEFLECTION COILS,ST MISALIGNED DUE TO VIBRATION OR TEMPERTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SELF TEST WILL DETECT ERRORS- THE OTHER ST AND COAS CAN BE USED
AS BAC_P "
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 610 ABORT:
HDw/FuNc
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-STAR TRACKER POWER
CB OR SW FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA -
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) STAR TRACKER
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PANELS 06,014,015
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
2 CB'S (MC454-0026"2030),2 SW'S (ME452-0102-7101)
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - THE WORKING ELEMENT (CB OR SW) CAN BE USED TO TURN THE
POWER OFF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 611 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT-STAR TRACKER POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
i
i
i
i
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC i.
2) STAR TRACKER
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s) _-
6)
"I)
8) =
9)
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
PANELS 06,014,015
2 CBIS (MC454-0026-2030),2 SW'S (ME452-0102-7101)
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION IN CB OR SW
LOSS OF THAT STAR TRACKER- THE OTHER ST AND COAS CAN BE USED AS
BACKUP
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT --_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 612
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-STARTRACKER POWER
SWITCH SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: LES _DRAPE_ _ ...._SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GNC
2) STAR TRACKER
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ]
PANELS 06,014,015 -
B [ P] c[P]
2 CB'S (MC454-0026-2030),2 SW'S (ME452-0102-7101)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THAT STAR TRACKER - CB WILL SHUT POWER SUPPLY OFF-THE
OTHER ST AND COAS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COAS
COAS LIGHT OUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) COAS
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL 01 (CMD'S STATION),OVERHEAD WINDOW W7 (AFT
STATION)
PART NUMBER: V620-660-810
CAUSES:
SHORT
LOSS OF POWER, LAMP BROKEN DUE TO VIBRATION,ELECTRICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - 2 ST'S AVAILABLE - A FLASHLIGHT CAN BE USED TO LIGHT
THE RETICLE
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: _ 10/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 702
ITEM: COAS
FAILURE MODE: RETICLE BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2) COAS
3)
4)
5)
6)
T)
8)
9)
.... CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HOW/nine ABORT HDW/nmC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: _ 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 01 (CHD'S STA_ION),OV_;aEAD WINDOW W_ (AFT
STATION)
PART NUMBER: V620-660-810
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COAS - 2 ST'S AVAILABLE
v
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 710 ABORT:
ITEM: CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
FAILURE MODE: CB OR SWITCH FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) COAS
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANELS 01, 019, L4
PART NUMBER: I CB (MC4S4-0026-2030), 2 SW'S (ME482-0i02-7101_ _i
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE- THE WORKING ELEMENT(CB OR SW) CAN BE USED TO TURN THE POWER
OFF .........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
....DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST-CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 711 ABORT:
ITEM: CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA _SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA "
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) COAS
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [-_A _ B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS 01, 019, L4
i CB (MC454-0026-2030), 2 SW'S (ME452-0102-7101)
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - THE OTHER POWER SWITCH CAN BE USED
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
712 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
CB FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) COAS
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANELS 01, 019, L4
PART NUMBER: 1 CB (MC454-0026-2030), 2 SW'S (ME452-0102-7101)
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF THE FWD & AFT POWER CIRCUITS,BUT A FLASHLIGHT CAN BE USED
TO LIGHT THE _TICLE - 2 ST'S SERVE AS BACKUP
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 801 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
S/1R
ITEM: ADTA
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) ADTA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V7 IA2,8 IV7 IAI, 8 IV7 IA3,8 IV7 IA4
PART NUMBER: MC409-0011-0006
c[P]
CAUSES: ATTACHMENT 801
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT: FOR PASS S/W, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WILL BE
DETECTED(FDI,BITE,COMM FAULT) BY RM AND THE ASSOCIATED ADTA WILL
BE DESELECTED BY RM
NO EFFECT: FOR BFS, S/W ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WILL BE
DETECTED(BITE,COMM FAULT,MCC) AND THE ASSOCIATED ADTA WILL BE
DESELECTED BY BFS OR CREW. NOTE: LOSS OF INPUT FROM ONE
PROBE(SINGLE PNEUMATIC INPUT INCLUDED) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF TWO
ADTA'S
REFERENCES:
C-48REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
8O2 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ADTA
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ADTA
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/3
A[1] B [P] C [P]
82V71A2,81V71A1,8iV71A3,81V71A4
MC409-0011-0006
CAUSES: INTERNAL POWER SUPPLY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT: FOR PASS S/W, NO OUTPUT WILL BE DETECTED(FDI,BITE, COMM
FAULT) BY RM AND THE ASSOCIATED ADTA WILL BE DESELECTED BY RM.
NO EFFECT: FOR BFS S/W, NO O_PUT W_LL BE DETEC_D(BiTE,COMM _
FAULT,MCC) AND THE ASSOCIATED ADTA WILL BE DESELECTED BY BFS OR
CREW.
REFERENCES : .....................
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
810 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ADTA
3) ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CBI9-PNL016,CB20-PNL016,CB25-PNL015,CB26-PNL014
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CB FAILURE - CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA - 3 REMAINING ADTA'S ARE SUFFICIENT TO PERFORM
MISSION
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP/<SHEET
DATE: 10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 811 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
l
I
m
b
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC u
2) ADTA
3) ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
4)
5) •
6)
7)
8) ms
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A IN/A] B IN/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION: CB19-PNL016,CB20-PNL016,CB25-PNL015,CB26-PNL014
PART_MBER: M_454"0026-_050 ..........
CAUSES: CB FAILURE - CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ADTA CANNOT BE POWERED OFF - POSSIBLE POWER CONSUMPTION PROBLEM
ms
I
ms
ms
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o3/86
GNC
812
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
RESISTOR (RLR07C5101GR) sHORTS TO GROUND OR OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ADTA
3) ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
A IN/A] B-IN/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A3R2-PNL014,PNL015,PNL016
RLR07CSI01GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILUER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ADTA POWER CIRCUIT CANNOT BE MONITORED BY MDM - NOT CRITICAL TO
FLIGHT
REFERENCES: SEE SECTION 1
w
C-52REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RGA
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) RGA (ORB)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/1R TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/1R
B [P]
HDW/FUNC
_/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
C[P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PLB(33V73AI4,15,16B)
MC493-00iS-_II ...... _ _ _
CAUSES: TEMP., VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURE FAIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE. MAX 4 LVL OF REDUNDANCY, POSS LOSS OF MISS DUE TO FLT
RULES.
NONE. SECOND FAIL MAY NOT BE ANNUNCIATED, BUT MCC CAN DETECT.
ms
m
mm
g
i
Z
[]
l
m
I
m
g
m
I
REFERENCES :
B
I
B
[]
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-53
m
[]
_-- :
E
w
w
n.--
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 902
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RGA
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GNC
2 ) RGA (ORB)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
e)
9)
_CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: PLB(33V73AI4,15, 16)
PART NUMBER: MC493-0015-0011
CAUSES: TEMP., V_BRATION, MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURE FAIL,
IMPROPER INPUT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. MAX 4 LVL OF REDUNDANCY, POSS LOSS OF MISS DUE TO FLT
RULES.
NONE. SECOND FAIL MAY NOT BE ANNUNCIATED, BUT MCC CAN DETECT.
REFERENCES:
C-54REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 903 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PWR SW RGA 1,2,3,4
FAILS ON, FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2 ) RGA (ORB)
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4) SWITCHES
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
31XR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PLB(33V73A14,15, 16) .....
PART NUMBER: VS70-710159
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRU FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAIL ON - NO EFFECT EXCEPT ON POWER CONSUMPTION, NO LOSS OF RGA
FAIL OFF LOSS OF RGA, RM_LL USE OUTPUT FROM OTHER RGA)S.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 904 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: DIODES & RESIST (ORB)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) RGA (ORB)
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4) DIODES ABD RESISTORS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PLB (33V73A14,15,16)
VS70-710159
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRU FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE EFFECTED RGA.
NONE: RM WILL DISCARD RGA AND DOWNMODE ON SUB FAILURES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 905 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: RPC'S (ORB)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON, FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
GNC
RGA (ORB)
POWER CIRCUIT
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS (RPC'S)
CRITICALITiES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R
ONOI_BIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/ 1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PLB(33V73A14,15,16) ....
VSV0-V10159 ....
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECEPART
STR-U =FA_LUP_ _ ...... :
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
FAIL ON - NO EFFECT EXCEPT ON POWER CONSUMPTION ._
FAIL OFF - LOSSOF RGA'S 2 OR 3, RGA i _:_:HiVE TWO RED RPC'S,
POSS U_U_CH DEU_Y.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 950 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
S/ZR
ITEM: RGA (SRB)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RGA (SRB)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
....e_f_ZC_LZ_IES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTO?F: _ _ 3/IR " TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
231A5,A6)
PART NUMBER:
A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LEFT SRB (RGAI & 21131AS,A6); RIGHT SRB(RGA2 & 4-
MC493-0015-0105
CAUSES: TEMP, VIBRATiON,MECH SHOCK, LOSS OF INPUT,PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - THE FAILED RGA WILL BE DESELECTED BY RM AND THE SEL FILTER
WILL DOWNMODE TO MVS AND USE THE REMAINING RGA'S
REFERENCES:
C-58REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
951 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RGA (SRB)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RGA (SRB)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTO?F: _i L_ 3/IR . TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ...............
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: LEFT SRB (RGAI & 2-131AS.A@); RIGHT SRB(RGA2 & 4-._
23iAS, A-6)..........._ ......
PART NUMBER: MC493-0015-0105
CAUSES: TEMP, VIBRATION,MECH SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE - THE FAILED RGA WILL BE DESELECTED BY RM AND THE SEL FILTER
WiLL DOWNMODE TO MVS AND USE THE _MAINING RGA'S
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 960 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT - SRB RGA POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RGA (SRB)
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILURES IN THE RPC'S,VOLTAGE SENSING CET,SWITCH
CAT,RELAY,DIODES;GENERIC CAUSES:SHORTS,VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE RGA - BUT ONLY A FAILURE IN TWO COMPONENTS COULD
CAUSE TOTAL LOSS OF PWR TO A SINGLE RGA.IF TOTAL PWR IS LOST,THE
RGA WILL BE DESELECTED BY RM AND THE SF WILL DOWNMODE TO MVS AND
USE THE REMAINING RGA'S.
REFERENCES: ECN NO. I02-8019A
C-60REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 961 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT - SRB RGA POWER
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
I
mm
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC ..
2) RGA (SRB)
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s) u
6)
7)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT IN RPC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN'T SHUT OFF PWR TO AN SRB PWR BUS PRIOR TO SEP - NO DAMAGE TO
ORBITER - MAY CAUSE DAMAGE TO SRB .... _
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INDEPENDENT ORBI#_R ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ( ON EITHER AXIS OR ON ONE AXIS )
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AAI-AREA 81 BAY I; AA2,3,4-AREA 82 BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-2043
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, POWER SUPPLY FAILURE,PICKOFF LAMP
FAILURE,DIFF AMP FAILURE-VIBRATION, SHOCK, EXTREME TEMP. CAN
CAUSE INTERNAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - RM WILL NOT USE THE FAILED AA
REFERENCES:
C-62REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1002 ABORT:
ITEM: ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AAI-AREA 81 BAY i; AA2,3,4-AREA 82 BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC62i-0043-2043
CAUSES: POWER SUPPLY FAILURE,PICKOFF LAMP FAILURE,DIFF AMP
FAILURE-VIBRATION, SHOCK, EXTREME TEMP. CAN CAUSE INTERNAL
FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - RM WILL NOT USE THE FAILED AA
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
i010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-AA'S 1 & 2 POWER
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
AA'S 1 & 2 POWER CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS 014,015
2 CB'S (MC454-0026-2030)
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT IN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER DUE TO
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AA'S 1 & 2 CAN NOT BE TURNED OFF.NO EFFECT EXCEPT ON ELECTRICAL
POWER CONSUMABLES.MAY EFFECT MISSION LENGTH.
REFERENCES:
C-64REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
i011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-AA'S 1 & 2 POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
AAIS 1 & 2 POWER CIRCUITS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ..... ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/1R
A[ I] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS 014,015
2 CB'S (MC454-0026-2030)
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE IN CIRCUIT BREAKER .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THAT AA-THE DATA FROM THE OTHER 3 AA'S WILL BE USED
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-65
g
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-AA'S 3 & 4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD" LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
AA'S 3 & 4 POWER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: VS70-971099
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AA'S 3 & 4 HAVE TWO POWER CIRCUITS.ONLY A FAILURE ON EACH OF THE
CIRCUITS COULD RESULT IN AN OPEN CIRCUIT I.E. BOTH SW
CONTACTS,BOTH RPC'S,BOTH RESISTORS,BOTH DIODES,OR VARIOUS
COMBINATIONS.
ANY SINGLE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWO
POWER CIRCUITS.IF TOTAL POWER IS LOST,RM WILL USE DATA FROM THE
OTHER 3 AA'S.
REFERENCES:
C-66REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT-AA'S 3 & 4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
GNC
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
AA'S 3 & 4 POWER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VS70-971099
VS70-971099
CAUSES: INTERNAL SHORT _N SWITCH OR RPC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AA'_S3 & 4HAVE TWO POWER sUPPLY CIRCUITS.EITHERCIRCUIT _O_L__BE
FAILED CLOSED BYA SI--NGLE FAILURE IN THE SW OR RPC.THE AA CANNOT
BE TURNED OFF EXCEPT BY SHUTTING OFF _E BUSS POWER WHICH EFFECTS
OTHER SYSTEMS.ELECTRICAL POWER CONSUMPTION IS AFFECTED.
MAY AFFECT MISSION LENGTH.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: II01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ASA
FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL OFF IN ONE CHN
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3 mR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-I), 5(ASA-2),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6046
c[P]
6 (ASA- 3,4).
CAUSES: LOSS OF DRIVER POWER, DRIVER CIRCUIT FAIL OFF (VIBR,
TEMP, MECH SHOCK).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE: LOSS OF 1 OF 4 VLV CHN'S. TWO ISOL VALVE DRIVERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE CHN MUST FAIL BEFORE AEROSURFACE CONTROL IS AFFECTED.
FCS CHECKOUT (OPS-8) WILL DETECT THIS FAILURE PRIOR TO ENTRY. SEC
DELTA P >2025 WILL INDICATE ISOL CMD FL IF NO ACTR CHN FL SIGNAL
PRESENT.
w
REFERENCES".
C-68REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ASA
ISOL CMD FL ON FOR ONE CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) ASA
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4 (ASA-1),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6046
B [ P ] C [ P]
5 (ASA-2), 6 (ASA-3,4).
CAUSES: ISOL VLV CIRCUIT FL. ERRONEOUS FAULT DETECT or PS FL
IND._ _ _ ..........................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : .............................
NONE:1 OF 4 _ISOL_ VLV CHNrS COMMANDED TO BYPASS. ACTR SURFACE
WILL BE CONTROLLED BY REMAINING CHN'S.
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B IS SATISFIED BY ACTR CHN FAIL SIGNAL.
L
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REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1103 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ASA
FAILURE MODE: NO POSITION ERR CMD TO ACTR CHN (NULL OUTPUT).
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/iR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-I), S(ASA-2),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6046
c[P]
6 (ASA-3,4).
CAUSES: SERVO VLV DRIVER CIRCUIT OR PWR FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH i CHN CMD AT 0 (NULL) OUTPUT, OTHER 3 CHN'S WILL CNTRL
SURFACE POSITION. WITH 2 UNDETECTED NULL CHN FLS, ASA MAY FAIL
GOOD CHN'S AND PRIME SEL FAILED CHN'S DURING ENTRY. MCC MAY NOT
BE ABLE TO DETECT TWO NULL FAILURES EXISTING AT THE SAME TIME.
FOR PASS B SCREEN REQUIREMENT, SUFFICIENT DATA IS PRESENT IN MCC
TO DETERMINE SYSTEM REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ASA
ERRONEOUS POSITION ERROR CMD TO ACTR.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-I), 5(ASA-2), 6(ASA-3,4).
MC621-0043-6046
CAUSES: ASA CMD OR FEEDBACK CIRCUIT FAILURE (MECH SHOCK, TEMP,
VIBR). ERRONEOUS POSITION CMD FROM GPC/MDM. FDBK XDUCR FL (LOSS
OF PWR, OPEN CIR, NON LINEAR).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __
NONE: THREE-?C'St_fN]SREMAINiN_°_?TER THE FAILEDC}TN IS ISOLATED
FROM THE ACTR CONTROL CIRCUIT. IF TWO UNDETECTED ERRONEOUS CMDS
EXIST, A 2 ON 2 FORCE FIGHT WILL EXIST AND ASA MAY FAIL GOOD
FOR PASS B SCREEN REQUIREMENT, SUFFICIENT DATA IS PRESENT IN MCC
TO DETERMINE SYSTEM REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
1105 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDBK XDR CHN.
ASA
NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) ASA
s)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-1), 5(ASA-2),
MC621-004S-6046
c[P]
6 (ASA-3,4) .
CAUSES: LOSS OF XDCR PWR,OPEN CIRCUIT, NON LINEAR CIRCUIT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: ONLY I FAILURE OF 4 REDUNDANT XDUCR CHANNELS. COULD CAUSE
FAILURE (ISOLATION) OF 1 OF 4 FCS ACTR CHN'S.
MULTIFAILURES OF PFB CHN'S WILL AFFECT POSITION CMD'S FROM DAP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
1106 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
XDCR CHN.
ASA
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE SEC DELTA P FDBK
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
3/3
3/2R
3/3
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-I),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6046
HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/IR
TAL: 3/ 1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/ 1R
B [ P]
5 (ASA-2),
c[P]
6 (ASA- 3,4).
CAUSES: OPEN CIR, LOSS OF PWR, NON LINEAR CIRCUIT (VIBR, TEMP).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE:................ IiTI
INTERFERE WITH NOMINAL OPERATION OF ISOL CMD DRIVER CHN, AND MAY
REQUIRE MANUAL CNTL (BYPASS/OVERRIDE) OF THE ISOL CMD.
IT WILL IMPACT SEC DELTA P FDBKFUNT:TTON TO REDUCE & DISTRIBUTE
PRESS DURING SERVO VALVE FORCE FIGHTS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBIT+R-ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
1107 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDBK XDCR CHN.
ASA
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON 1 ELVN PRI DELTA P
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4 (ASA-I), _5(ASA-2),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6046
C [P]
6 (ASA-3,4).
CAUSES: LOSS OF XDCR PWR, OPEN CIRCUIT, NONLINEAR CIRCUIT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE:ONLY 1 FAILURE OF 4 REDUNDANT XDCR CHN'S. ELVN PRI DELTA P
FDBK IS SUMMED WITH POSITION CMD TO DETERMINE POSITION ERROR CMD
TO ACTR SERVO VALVE CHN.
MULTIFAILURES WILL CAUSE RM TO SELECT INCORRECT PRI DELTA P FDBK
FOR ASC DAP TO BIAS ELVN LOAD RELIEF SCHEDULE.
REFERENCES:
C-74REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 1108 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: ASA
FAILURE MODE: BDY FLP CMD CHN (i OF 3) INOPERATIVE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ASA
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AV BAY 4(ASA-I), 5(ASA-2), 6(ASA-3,4).
MC621-0043-6046
CAUSES: PWR SUPPLY FL INHIBIT SIG TO BDY FLAP VLV DRIVERS, NO
BDY FLAP ENA CMD, FAILURE OF BDY FLP UP/DWN VLV DRIVE CIRCUIT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE: ONLY 1 FAILURE OF 3 REDUNDANT BDY FLP CMD CHN'S.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: iii0 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED (AT
TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASA/ATVC
FCS CHANNEL CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL C3 A1 ( SW $6, S7, $8, $9 ). REF VS70-790209
SCH DIAG.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7356). REF VS70-733402.
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT SHORTED INTERNALLY (CONTAMINATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURE FAILURE).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERRIDE POSITION: 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FL ON, HAS NO EFFECT. 2 CONT
DISAGREE, NO OVERRIDE FOR THAT CHANNEL. 3 CONT FAIL ON, OVERRIDE
REMAINS ON, NO DELTA P ISOLATION FOR THAT CHN. OFF POSITION WILL
REMOVE THE CHN (ISOLATE CMD ON).
AUTO POSITION: 1 OF 2 CONT FAIL ON, PWR IS APPLIED TO ASA/ATVC
THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE PWR SW. WHEN SYS NOT REQ, PWR REMOVED BY
PWR SW CIRCUIT. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK TO
MONITOR SYS STATUS.
REFERENCES:
C-76REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: iiii ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND (AT TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
ASA/ATVC
FCS CHANNEL CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL C3 Ai ( SW $6, $7, $8, $9 ). REF VS70-790209
SCH DIAG.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7356). REF VS70-733402.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERRIDE POSITION: 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FL OFF, HAS NO EFFECT. 2 CONT
DISAGREE, NO OVERRIDE FOR THAT CHANNEL. 3 CONT'S FAIL OFF, NO
OVERRIDE CAPABILITY FOR CHN. RESET CAPABILITY FROM SPEC 53 (OPS-
3) _ 801 (oPs-8).
AUTO POSITION: 1 OF 2 CONTACTS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF ONLY i DUAL
REDUNDANT PWR SOURCE. 2 CONT FL OFF, LOSS OF PWR TO THE ASA/ATVC
DOWNLINK TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1112 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
FAILURE MODE: DIODE FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
GNC
ASA/ATVC
FCS CHANNEL CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
SCH DIAG.
PART NUMBER:
PNL C3 A1 ( SW $6, $7, $8, $9 ). REF VS70-790209
SW'S: (ME452-0102-7356). REF VS70-733402.
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1 DIODE OPEN, LOSS OF ONLY 1 OF THE REDUNDANT CNTL BUS POWER TO
ASA (ATVC) WHILE SWITCH IS IN OVERRIDE. 2 DIODES OPEN WILL RESULT
IN NO CNTL BUS POWER TO ASA (ATVC) CHN WHILE IN OVERRIDE (ISOLATE
CMDS ON).
TWO SERIAL DIODES SHORTED, WAS NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
OVERIDE CAPABILITY FROM SPEC 53 (OPS-3) AND 801 (OPS-8).
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK TO MONITOR SYS
STATUS.
REFERENCES:
C-78REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GNC
2) ASA
3) ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
311R
3/1R
c[P]
LOCATION: PNL O14 SIO, 015 $9, 016 $8,$9. REF VS70-790229 SCH
DIAG.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7301). REF VS70-971099, 790229
SCH DIAG'S. _IZ .............
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR, RPC(5A, 10A),
OR DIODE(12A,35A) FAIL OPEN_OR SH__ORTED TO GROUND__GENERIC CAUSES:
V_, _AL PART A_URE, CONT_INATiON, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......._.... _ T_:_........ _ .........
EACH OF THE FOUR ASA'S DRIVE A REDUNDANT FCS CHANNEL. A SINGLE
FAIL_CANREMOVE ASA-4 ISOL VALVE DRIVER POWER _VLV FLD .......
CLOSED). TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED IN ALL OTHER CASES TO LOS_ ......
POWER TO A_ASA POWERSUPPLY:ORISOL VALVE DRIVER CIRCUIT.
ACTUATOR ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE COMMANDED OPEN IF POWER IS LOST
TO THE ASA POWER SUPPLY. IF POWER IS LOST TO THE ISOL VALVE
DRIVERS, _ ACTUATOR _SOLAT_ON VALVES WILL BE COMMANDED TO THE
CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT-ASAWS 1,2,3,4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS CLOSED (ON), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ASA
ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
DIAG.
PART NUMBER:
SCH DIAGIS.
PNL O14 SI0, 015 $9, 016 $8,$9. REF VS70-790229 SCH
SW'S: (ME452-0102-7301). REF VS70-971099, 790229
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACTS OR RPC(5A, 10A) SHORTED INTERNALLY.
GENERIC CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, INTERNAL PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH OF THE FOUR ASA'S DRIVE A REDUNDANT FCS CHNL. IF A SW
CONTACT OR RPC SHORTS IN A CLSD (ON) STATE, PWR WILL BE APPLIED
TO THE ASA PWR SUPPLY OR ISOLATION VLV DRIVERS. FOR PWR SW
CONTACTS SHORTED, ASA PWR SUPPLY CAN BE TURNED OFF BY THE FCS
CHNL SW.
THE ISOLATION VALVE DRIVERS WILL REMAIN POWERED (ISOL VALVE
COMMANDED TO OPEN) WITH FCS CHANNEL SWITCH OFF. FAILURE WILL
EFFECT POWER CONSUMABLES, AND MAY EFFECT MISSION LENGTH.
REFERENCES:
C-80REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF
NO OUTPUT TO JET
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) RJD
3) RJDF
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD BAY
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6244
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/IR
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. S/W WILL SELECT ALTERNATE JET.
NONE. ORIENTATION OF JET 0N OTHER MANIFOLDS ALLOWS SAME EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RJDA
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) RJD
3) RJDA
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: .... 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BAY
MC621-0043-6244
CAUSES:
FAIL
MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. S/W WILL SELECT ALTERNATE JET.
NONE. ORIENTATION OF JET ON OTHER MANIFOLDS ALLOWS SAME EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
C-82REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA
INADVERTENT JET FIRING
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RJD
3) RJDA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BAY
MC621-0043-6244
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
S/WWILL SHUT JET DWN. MINIMUM FIRING MAY OCCUR; MAY BE FATAL IF
PERSO_EL iN V_I_ITY OF JET_PLUME ....... -
MAY CAUSE VEHICLE DAMAGE IF IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF TGT VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1206
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
RJDF
INADVERTENT JET FIRING
HDW/FUNC
i/i
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2 ) RJD
3) RJDF
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: FWD BAY
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6244
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
S/W WILL SHUT JET DWN. MINIMUM FIRING MAY OCCUR; MAY BE FATAL IF
PERSONNEL IN VICINITY OF JET PLUME.
MAY CAUSE VEHICLE DAMAGE IF IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF TGT VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
C-84REPORT DATE 12/15/86
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PC FEEDBACK
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
B_AKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2) RJD
3) RJDF
4) CHAMBER PRESSURE FEEDBACK
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONO_: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD BAY
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6244
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAiq_, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. RM WILL DETECT FAIL ON/OFF AND NOT SELECT JET.
[]
g
I
l
M
Z
[]
i
I
mm
mm
m
m
lid
_m
mm
REFERENCES:
l
g
I
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-85
a
EINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PC FEEDBACK
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H' SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) RJD
3) RJDA
4) CHAMBER PRESSURE FEEDBACK
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT BAY
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6244
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. RM WILL DETECT FAIL ON/OFF AND NOT SELECT JET.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-86
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
PO_R CIR_IT
CIR_IT FAIL CLOSE (INADVE_ OUTPUT)
_AD _ALYST: T_, W. H. SUBSYS _AD: D_PE_, KS
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) GNC
2) RJD
3) _DF
4) PO_R CIR_IT
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_TION_ _ BAY
P_T _MBER: VS70-420109,209,309
_USES: MECH SHOCK, VIB_TION, CO_AMINATION, PIECE P_T STRU
FAIL, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NONE. PO_R SUPPLIED FOR _GIC BUT NO CMDS FROM GPC. MAY_BE
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION.
NONE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT FAIL CLOSE (INADVERENT OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) RJD
3) RJDA
4) POWER CIRCUIT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT BAY
VS70-420109,209,309
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL, SHORTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. POWER SUPPLIED FOR LOGIC BUT NO CMDS FROM GPC. MAY BE
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION.
NONE.
REFERENCES:
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C-88REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2 ) RJD
3) RJDA
4) POWER CIRCUIT
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1_
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT BAY
PART NUMBER: VS70-420109,209,309
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART S_TRU
FA_L_ _S_E]_TO _Gi_.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. JETS ON THAT MANIFQLD WILL NOT FIR_ _;_, _
OTHER_ANIFOLDS ARE AVAILABLE. CREW CAN DISABLE THAT MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST _RITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: POWER CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2 ) RJD
3) RJDF
4) POWER CIRCUIT
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD BAY
VS70-420109,209,309
CAUSES: MECH SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRU
FAIL, SHORTED TO GROUND.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. JETS ON THAT MANIFOLD WILL NOT FIRE.
OTHER MANIFOLDS ARE AVAILABLE. CREW CAN DISABLE THAT MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: ATVC
FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL OFF IN ONE CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ATVC
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/ 1R TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4(ATVC-I), 5(ATVC-2), 6(ATVC-3,4). _
PART _BER: MC621-0043-6541
CAUSES: LOSS OF DRVR PWR, DRVR CIRCUIT FL OFF (VIBR, TEMP, ME CH
SHOCK). ...............................................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : ...........
_o_. LO_s o_i_4 vLv eriN'S.I_OI_Ir_QLV_V DRI__ _H_
_SPECTIVE Cm_ MUST ;L _O_SC _%_V_ C_L _S AFFECTED.
NO WAY TO DETECT ISOL VLV FLD OFF. SEC DELTA P >2200 WILL
INDICATE ISOL CMD FL IF NO ACTR CHN FL SIGNAL PRESENT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER AsSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1302 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: ATVC
FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL ON FOR ONE CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2) ATVC
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AV BAY 4(ATVC-1), 5(ATVC-2),
MC621-0043-6541
=
B [ P] C [P]
6 (ATVC-3,4).
CAUSES:
IND.
ISOL VLV CIRCUIT FL, ERRONEOUS FAULT DETECT, FALSE PS FL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: 1 OF 4 ISOL VLV CHN'S COMMANDED TO BYPASS. THRUST VECTOR
CONTROL WILL BE MAINTAINED BY REMAINING CHN'S.
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B IS SATISFIED BY ACTR CHN FAIL SIGNAL.
REFERENCES:
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1303 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ATVC
FAILURE MODE: NO POSITION CMD TO ACTR CHN (NULL OUTPUT).
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ATVC
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AV BAY 4(ATVC-I), S(ATVC-2), 6(ATVC-3,4).
MC621-0043-6541
CAUSES:
VIBR).
SERVO VLV DRVR PW-R OR CIRCUIT FAILURE (MECH SHOCK, TEMP,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH i C_ CMD AT 0 (NULL) OUTPUT, OTHER 3 CHN'S WILL MAINTAIN
THRUST VECTOR CNTL. DURING FLIGHT, SUFFICIENT MCC DATA AVAILABLE
TO SATISFY REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FOR PASS. MCC MAY NOT BE ABLE TO
DETECT TWO NULL FAILURES EXISTING AT THE SAME TIME.
FOR 3.8 SEC DURING ENGINE IGNITION TO L/O, FORCED ATVC OVERRIDE
IS IN EFFECT. WITH TWO UNDETECTED FLD CHN CMDS, A 2 ON 2 FORCE
FIGHT WILL EXIST AND ATVC MAY FAIL GOOD CHN'S AND PRIME SELECT
FLD CHN'S DURING ASCENT CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i0/0i/86 _ _ HIGHEST _CALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1304 ABORT:
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: ATVC
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS POSITION CMD TO ACTR.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) ATVC
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
211R
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4 (ATVC-I),
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6541
B [P]
5 (ATVC-2) ,
c[P]
6 (ATVC-3,4).
CAUSES: ATVC CMD CIRCUIT FAILURE (MECH SHOCK, TEMP, VIBR).
ERRONEOUS POSITION CMD FROM GPC/MDM. SEC DELTA P REDUNDANT
CHANNEL EQUALZATION CIRCUIT FAILURE (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT). SEC DELTA
P XDCR CIRCUIT FAILURE (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
3 CMD CHN'S REMAIN AFTER THE FLD CMD IS DETECTED AND ISOLATED
FROM THE ACTR CONTROL CIRCUIT. DURING FLIGHT, SUFFICIENT MCC DATA
IS AVAILABLE TO SATISFY REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FOR PASS.
FOR 3.8 SEC DURING ENGINE IGNITION TO L/O, FORCED ATVC OVERRIDE
IS IN EFFECT. IF TWO UNDETECTED CHN CMD FL'S EXIST, A 2 ON 2
FORCE FIGHT WILL EXIST AND ATVC MAY FAIL GOOD CHN'S AND PRIME
SELECT FLD CHNtS DURING ASCENT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1305 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: ATVC
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE SEC DELTA P FDBK
XDCR CHN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ATVC
3)
4)
s)
4)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTO_F: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R _
311R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AV BAY 4(ATVC-I), S(ATVC-2), 6(ATVC-3,4).
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-6541
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF PWR, NON LINEAR CIRCUIT (VIBR,
TEMP).
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ _'_ _ .....
NONE: ONLY-_F_!LURE OF 4 REDuND_T XDCR CHN'S. WILL _ERFERE
WITH NOMINAL OPERATION OF THE ISOL CMD DRIVER CHN, AND MAY
REQUIRE MANUAL CNTL (BYPASS/OVERRIDE) 0FTH _ ISOL CMD CHN. _
FAILUI_EW_LL IMPAT_T_E_DE_T_DBK?UNCT_TO RE___
DISTRIBUTE PRESS DURING SERVO VALVE FORCE FIGHTS. SUFFICIENT MCC
DATA AVAILABLE TO SATISFY REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FOR PASS.
REFERENCES:
m
m
m
m
I
l
u
[]
m
===
I
[]
i )
m_
REPORT DATE 12/15/84 C-95
-im
m
mi
w
E_
z
i
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/28/86 HIGHESTCRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT- ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ATVC
3) ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER CIRCUIT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT oP_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014 SI, $2, $3, $4. REF VS70-790239 SCH DIAG.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7301). REF VS70-971099, -790239
SCH DIAGfS.
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR, RPC(SA,3A), OR
DIODE(12A) FAIL OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND. GENERIC CAUSES:
VIBRATION, INTERNAL PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH SHOCK,
THERMAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH OF THE FOUR ATVC'S DRIVE A REDUNDANT FCS CHANNEL. A SINGLE
FAILURE CAN REMOVE ATVC ISOL VALVE DRIVER POWER ( VLV FLD
CLOSED). TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE POWER TO AN ATVC POWER
SUPPLY.
ACTUATOR ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE COMMANDED OPEN IF POWER IS LOST
TO THE ATVC POWER SUPPLY. IF POWER IS LOST TO THE ISOL VALVE
DRIVERS, THE ACTUATOR ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE COMMANDED TO THE
CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES:
C-96REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT-ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS CLOSED (ON), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
LEAD ANALYST : ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GNC
ATVC
ATVCIS 1,2,3,4 POWER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/-3-::
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SCH DIAG'S.
PNL O14 SI, $2, $3, $4. REF VS70-790239 SCH DIAG.
SW'S: (ME452-0102-7301). REF VS70-971099, -790239
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACTS OR RPC(SA,3A) SHORTED INTERNALLY.
GENERIC CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, INTERNAL PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
EACH OF THE ATVC'S DRIVE A REDUNDANT FCS CHNL. IF A SW CONTACT OR
RPC SHORTS IN A CLSD (ON) STATE, PWR WILL BE APPLIED TO THE ATVC
PWR SUPPLY OR ISOLATION VLV DRIVERS. FOR P_ SW CONTACTS SHORTED,
ATVC PWR SUPPLY CAN BE TURNED OFF BY THE FCS CHN SW.
THE ISOLATION VALVE DRIVERS WILL REMAIN POWERED (ISOL VALVE _
COMM_DEb TO OPEN) WITH FCS C_EL SWITCH OFF. FAILURE WILL
EFFECT POWER CONSUMABLES, AND MAY EFFECT MISSION LENGTH.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1400 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP UP/DOWN SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT
RESISTOR FAILS OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) BODY FLAP CNTL CIRCUIT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL L2 AIS7, C3 AISI0, F2 $9, F4 $9. REF VS70-
790209, 971099 SCH DIAGWS.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7255, ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS
(RWR80SI211FR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IF 1 OF 2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OFF (DISAGREE), THE OUTPUT COMMAND
WILL BE SET OFF (ZERO OUTPUT). BODY FLAP CAN BE COMMANDED FROM
THE OTHER CREWMEMBER'S POSITON.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
C-98REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 1401 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: CIR_IT-BODY F_P CNTL
FAIL_ MODE: BODY F_P UP/DO_ SWITCH CONTACT FAI_ C_SED.
_D _ALYST: ROBERT O'DO_LL SUBSYS 7._AD: _STER D_PE_
B_KDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
BODY F_P CNTL CIR_IT
CRITI_LI_ES
_IGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R T_: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/_ ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LO_TION: PNL L2 AIS7, C3 AISI0, F2 $9, F4 $9. _F VS70-
790209, 971099 SCH DIAG'S.
P_T _MBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7255, ME452-0061-7140), _SISTORS
(R_80SI211FR) .
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T STRUC_E FAIL_' VIB_TION.
_T___: _ _. _ _ ...... _:
IF 1 O? 2 SWIT_ CONTACTS FAI--LS C_SED (ON), K _SA_-C__
WI_ EXIST _D NO OUTPUT COMM_D WILL BE ISS_D BY THE SOF_.
IF _O SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL C_SED (ON), _ ON COMM_D WILL BE
ISS_ BY THE SOFtiE ........... __
UP COMM_D W_LL OV_IDE A DO_MM_D. THE BODY F_P PBI SWITCH
CAN MODE THE DAP FROM MANUAL TO AUTO. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE
TEt_METRY DO,LINK _D DISP_YED IN T_ MCC TO MONITOR SYSTEM
STA_S.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1402 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP AUTO/MAN PBI SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT
LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) BODY FLAP CNTL CIRCUIT
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL L2 AIS7, C3 AISI0, F2 $9, F4 $9' REF VS70-
790209, 971099 SCH DIAG'S.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7255, ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS
(RWR80S12 IIFR).
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE,
TEMP, OVERLOAD CURRENT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED OFF (NO OUTPUT), RM WILL FAIL THE
CONTACT AND DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL RM DISAGREE CONDITION
WILL INHIBIT THE USE OF THE SWITCH (ZERO OUTPUT).
AUTO/MAN MODES CAN BE SELECTED FROM THE OTHER CREWMEMBER'S
POSITION. SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWN"LINK AND
DISPLAYED IN THE MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 1403 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP AUTO/MAN PBI SWITCH CONTACT FAILS
CLOSED. ............. .....
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) BODY FLAP CNTL CIRCUIT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL L2 AIS7, C3 AISI0, F2 $9, F4 $9. REF VS70-
790209, 971099 SCH DIAG'S.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7255, ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS
(RWR80SI2 lIFE). _ _ .......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE FAILURE, VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
FOR 1 OF 3 CONTACTS FAILED ON, RM WILL FAIL THE CONTACT AND
DOWNMODE TO THE 2-LVL. A 2-LVL RM DISAGREE STATE WILL INHIBIT THE
USE OF THE SWITCH (ZERO OUTPUT). _FIITH_E_SWITCH_CONTA_S FAIL
CLOSED (ON), AN ON COMMAND WILL BE ISSUED BY THE SOFTWARE.
IF CDR'S OR PLT'S BODY FLAP PBI SWITCH FAILS ON, THE DAP WILL
REMAIN IN THE LAST MODE SELECTED UNTIL FAILURE IS REMOVED.
SUFFICIENT DATA IS ON THE TELEMETRY DOWNLINK AND DISPLAYED IN THE
MCC FOR MONITORING SYSTEM STATUS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DKTE: 11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1404 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
BODY FLAP UP/DOWN CMD SWITCH JAMMED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
GNC
BODY FLAP CNTL CIRCUIT
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL L2 AIS7, C3 AISI0, F2 $9, F4 $9. REF VS70-
790209, 971099 SCH DIAG'S.
PART NUMBER: SW'S: (ME452-0102-7255, ME452-0061-7140), RESISTORS
(RWR80S 12 IIFR) .
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE
FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BODY FLAP SWITCH FAILS ON IN THE UP POSITION, A CONTINUOUS
UP CMD WILL BE ISSUED BY THE BF CMD SOP TO THE DAP. UP COMMAND
WILL OVERRIDE A DOWN CMD.
IF EITHER OF THE BODY FLAP PBI'S FAIL ON IN MAN MODE, THERE IS NO
WAY TO BRING THE BODY FLAP DOWN OR RETURN TO AUTO.
REFERENCES:
C-i02REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1501 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: A/B DAP PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
i
I
z
mm
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC i
2) DAP PBIs
3) A/B PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
4) __
S) "
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTO?F: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6
PART '_MBER: _ vS70-971099
r
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST TWO FAILURES: NONE. THIRD FAILUR_E" ONORBIT DAP SE_C_ION
COULD NOT BE CHANGED. HOWEVER, THE PARAMETER CHANGES CAN BE MADE
VIA _OARD.
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE OPPOSITE POSITION WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
m
mm
D
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z
mm
m
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-I03
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1502 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
A/B DAP PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ suBsYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GN&C
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9)
DAP PBIs
A/B PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GRO_, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: PBI WOULD BE INOPERATIVE,
BUT OTHER PANEL COULD BE USED.
ALSO, THE PARAMETERS CAN BE CHANGED VIA THE KEYBOARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-I04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1510 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: FWD AUTO/MAN PBI tS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GN C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD AUTO/MAN PBI'S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ON ORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: $3, $4 ;ME452-0061-4152,3
CAUSES: SHORT,STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST TWO FAILURES: NONE. THIRD FAILURE: MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FAILED POSN. _ _
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE OPPOSITE POS WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED MODE CHANGE COULD OCCUR, POSSIBLY AT A CRITICAL TIME,
E. G., ET SEP.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-10S
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FWD AUTO/MAN PBI'S
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ suBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD AUTO/MAN PBI'S
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCP]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: $3,$4;ME452"0061-4152,3
ccP]
CAUSES: SHORT, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: INABILITY TO PERFORM MODE
CHANGES
IN TRANS DAP, THE CREW CAN FLY IN EITHER AUTO OR MAN. AFT PANEL
COULD BE USED ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES:
C-I06REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1515 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
m
I
I
==_
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C _.
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
4)
5) i
6)
7)
8) i !
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _- ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A6
PART NUMBER: SI0, SII;ME452-0061-7142,7183
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST TWO FAILURES: NONE. THIRD FAILURE: MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FA_pD-STTIUN. .......................................................
IF FAILURE OC_D WHILE OPPOSITE POS WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR. BOTH AUTO AND MAN ARE USED ON
ORBIT.
REFERENCES:
g
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REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-I07
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/2i/86 .... HIGHESTCRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1516 ABORT:
ITEM: AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
..... CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: PANEL A6
PART NUMBER: SI0,SII;ME452-0061-7142,7183
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: MODE CHANGES WOULD HAVE TO
BE DONE WITH FWD PANEL.
BOTH AUTO AND MAN ARE NECESSARY FOR ORBIT OPS.
REFERENCES:
--=
w
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-i08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST TWO FAILURES: NONE. THIRD FAILURE: RCS JET SELECTION
WOULD REMAIN IN FAILED POS.
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE OPPOSITE POS WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssEsSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/2_/8 6
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
HIGHEST CRITI_LiTY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUB_YS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
313 TAL: 313
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: CHANGE WOULD HAVE TO BE
DONE WITH OTHER PNL.
TRANSLATION REQUIRES NORM JETS. IF NORM JETS CANNOT BE ENABLED
VIA PBI'S, TRANSITION TO OPS 3 COULD EFFECT THIS CHANGE.
REFERENCES:
C-II0REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1530 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
DAP PBIs
FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
- FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
ABORT
.......RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/2_
3/2R
3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: ROT MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FAILED POS. : :::....
iF FAILUREOCCURRED WHILE ANOTHER MODE WAS SELE_, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED POSITION COULD NOT BE SELECTED ON TRANS DAP, BUT THE AUTO
SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.
AFT PBI COULD BE USED ON ORBIT DAP.
REFERENCES:
C-i12REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1535 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
I
m
h
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C m
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [P] C [ P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: ROT MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FAILED POS.
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE ANOTHER MODE WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/22/86 HIGHEST_iTICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1536 ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
ITEM: FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
4)
s)
6)
_)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/2R TAL:
3/2R AOA:
3/2R ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED POSITION COULD NOT BE SELECTED ON TRANS DAP, BUT THE AUTO
SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.
AFT PBI COULD BE USED ON ORBIT DAP.
m REFERENCES:
w
C-I14REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIG_:
MDAC ID: 1540 ABORT:
ITEM: AFT DISC _TE ROT PBI'S
FAIL_ MODE: SWITCH CO.ACT FAIt_.D C_SED
T._.AD _YST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS _AD: L. D_PE_
HDW/_C
3/2R
3/2R
BR_O_ HIE_C_:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_E HDW/_C _ ....-__ORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 T_: 3/Y
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
P_EL A6
VS70"97i099
_USES: SHORT, S_Y P_TICT,_. ................
EFFECTS/_TIONAT,_.:
FIRST FAIL_: NONE. SECOND FAIL_: ROT MODE WO_D _MAIN IN
FAI_D POS. _ .......................
IF FAIL_ OC_D _I_ _ILE _OTHER MO_ WAS SE_CTED, _
_EXPECTED C_GE COULD OCC_.
_FE_NCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Io/ 4/86 H"IGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
AFT DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ S_;BSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PBI WOULD BE INOPERATIVE.
FWD PBI COULD BE USED.
REFERENCES :
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
C-I16REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1545 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: AFT PULSE ROT PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
I
D
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C ..
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT PULSE ROT PBI'S
4)
S) ,-
6)
7)
8) __
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
PANEL A6
VS70-971099
B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFECTS/  IO ALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: ROT MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FAILED POS.
IF FAILURE OCC_D WHILE ANOTHER MODE WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES :
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: AFT PULSE ROT PBI'S
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
iD/24T86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1546 ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT PULSE ROT PBI'S
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-97!099
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PBI WOULD BE INOPERATIVE.
FWD PBI COULD BE USED.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
312R
312R
w
L
C-I18REPORT DATE 12122/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1550 ABORT:
ITEM: ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_?_C _..........ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE
EFFEcTs/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: ROT MODE WOULD REMAIN IN
FAI_D PO_S_
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE ANOTHER MODE WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1551 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ s_sYs LEAD- L. DRAPEU_
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
k
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PBI WOULD BE INOPERATIVE.
PBI ON OPPOSITE PANEL COULD BE USED.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
REFERENCES:
C-120REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1560 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/5
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT, STRAY PARTICLE ...........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE: NONE. SECOND FAILURE: TRANS MODE WOULD REMAIN
IN FAI_D POS:,_ _7_:_:_ _....................._ ............. _ _
IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE ANOTHER MODE WAS SELECTED, AN
UNEXPECTED CHANGE COULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1561 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K' PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .....ABORT HDw/_c
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_TOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: ......3/2R .......AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 2 ] m [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, BROKEN CONTACT, FAILED RESISTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PBI WOULD BE INOPERATIVE.
PBI ON OPPOSITE PANEL COULD BE USED.
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/2R
REFERENCES:
C-122REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
A/B PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) A/B PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/ TIONA :
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
THE ABILITY TO CHANGE PARAMETERS V_A _OARD PROVIDES
RE D_DANCY,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30-/86 HIGHEST _RI'TICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1575 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FWD AUTO PBI
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD AUTO PBI
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
$3,ME452-0061-4142
CAUSES: B__E, JAMMINg, -BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAN MODE COULD BE SELECTED TEMPORARILY ONLY BY MOVING RHC.
AUTO SYSTEM P_OVIDES R_DUND-AN_YON TRANS DAP, BUT NOT ONORBIT.
BOTH AUTO AND MAN ARE USED ON ORBIT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/22/86 C-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1576 ABORT:
ITEM: FWD MAN PBI
FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) FWD MAN PBI
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
CRITICAL!TIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B[P]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
2/2
c[P]
LOCATION: P_L C3
PART NUMBS: $4,ME452-0061-4183
_ _ i_ _
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MANUAL MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED_
MANUAL IS__TO AUTO ON T_ANS_DAP, BUT NOT ONO_B_T.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1577 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY_SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PANEL A6
PART NUMBER: SI0, SII;ME452-0061-7142,7183
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
BOTH AUTO AND MANUAL ARE USED FOR ORBIT OPS_
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
C-126REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS C3 & A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED. IF NORM JAMMED, PROX
OPS WOULD BE IMPA_TED. ............
IF vE;a JINXED, T_S_Tf0_ _ULD NOT BE PE_ORMED _O_ GbiNG
TO OPS 3.
REFERENCES:
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/50/86 _GHEST-_TICALIT¥
GNC FLIGHT:
1581 ABORT:
FWD PULSE & D RATE ROT PBI'S
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
HDW/FU C
2/2
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
FWD PULSE & DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
VS70-971099
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMINGi BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
AUTO MODE WOULD STILL BE FUNCTIONAL. AUTO PROVIDES REDUNDANCY ON
TRANS DAP.
REFERENCES:
m
C-128REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1582 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AFT PULSE & D RATE ROT PBI'S
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
AFT PULSE & DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A6
VS70-971099
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
AUTO MODE WOULD STILL BE FUNCTIONAL.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1585 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
GN&C
DAP PBIs
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
-3/3
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6
PART NUMBER: VS70-971099
B [P] c[P]
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
AUTO MODE WOULD STILL BE FUNCTIONAL.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
C-130REPORT DATE 12/22/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1586 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GN&C
2) DAP PBIs
3) TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN_ _
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
ABORT HDW/_C
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANELS C3 & A6 _
P_T_: VS70'97i099
CAUSES: BREAKAGE, JAMMING, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MODE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED.
AUTO MODE WOULD STILL BE FUNCTIONAL: ........................
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1590 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNLS C3,F2,F4,A6
MC424-0263-0001
CAUSES: LAMP °BURNED OUT, OPEN LKMP DRIVER CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE ARE DUAL REDUNDANT LAMPS FOR EACH ANNUNCIATOR.
IF LAMP DRIVER FAILS, THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON BOARD
AND/OR AT THE MCC TO DETERMINE THE STATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1591 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: _ C3,F2,F4,A6
PART NUMBER: MC424-0263-0001
CAUSES: LAMP DRIVER ACTIVATED WITH NO INPUT FROM FSW._
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS AN EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. THERE WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT DATA-_--_ _i_ _!i i _i--_i_= i _i!_i_ _i-_ ..
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1593 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
NO OUTPUT FROM ACA
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ SUBSYS LEAD: L. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
GNC
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNLS C3,F2,F4,A6
PART NUMBER: MC424-0263-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORT, PIECE PART STRUCTURE FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUNCTION OF ONE ACA WOULD AFFECT MANY MORE SYSTEMS THAN
THE FCS, BUT WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION, CREW, OR VEHICLE.
THE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY LOSS OF ALL 5 ACA'S COULD CREATE
SUFFICIENT CONFUSION TO JEAPORDIZE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
C-134REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBIT_ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1601 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
FAIL_ MODE: E_ONEOUS OUTPUT (INCO_CT _MBER OF CONTACTS
ENERGIZED)
_D _ALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS _AD: L.J. D_PE_
BRE_O_ HIE_C_:
i) GNC
2) ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIR_IT
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
P__CH: 3/3
LI ?TOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DTNG/S_ING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RTt_:
T_:
AOA:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
ATO: _ 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [N/A] B CN/A] C CN/A]
_CATION: PNL L2
P_T _MBER: ME452-0102-7459, R_80S12 IIFR, J_TXVIN4246
_USES: CONTACT FAIreD OPEN OR c_sED, _SIsToR (R_80SI211FR)
SHORTED OR OPEN, DIODE (J_TXVlN4246) FAI_D C_SED. -
CONTAMINATION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, PIECE P_T STRUC_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/___
FIRST FAIL_ _ WILL SE_CT CO_CT MODE - FAULT MESSAGE "G51 RL
MODE SW" DISP_YED TO CREW
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1602 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
JAMMED SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [N/A] B IN/A] C ["/A]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
S25-PNLL2
ME452-0102-7459
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTOL MODE CAN BE RETURNED TO AUTO BY OPTION 42X ON OVERIDE
DISPLAY. LOW GAIN AND NO Y JET OPTIONS NO LONGER AVAILABLE. NOT
CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OR MISSION
REFERENCES:
C-136REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1801 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE ROTARY SWITCH, S1 OR ABORT MODE PUSH
BUTTON SWITCH, $2 CONTACT FAILED OPEN OR AIR2,AIR2,AIR3 SHORTED
TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2) ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL6-SIMS2,AIRI,AIR2,AIR3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5030,ME452-0061-4187,RW8051211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _i_
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT, SECOND FAILURE - DESIRED ABORT MODE
CANNOT BE SELECTED AND INITIATED VIA S1 & $2, DESIRED ABORT MODE
STILL BE SELECTED AND INITIATED VIA MM601 OR_ERIDE DISPLAY
IF TIME PERMITS
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1802 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE ROTARY SWITCH, S1 OR ABORT MODE PUSH
BUTTORN, $2 CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2)
3)
4)
s)
v)
8)
9)
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNLF6
ME452-0093-5030,ME452-0061-4187
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT, SECOND FAILURE - WRONG
BE INITIATED CAUSING LOSS OFF VEHICLE
ABORT MODE MAY
REFERENCES:
C-138REPORT DATE 12/15/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1803 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSH BUTTON SWITCH, $2, FAILED OPEN OR
ROTARY SWITCH, SI, FAILED OPEN IN THE POSITION REQUIRED FOR ........
ABORT. _.........
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE[_A-UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _7iR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 _ AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY -SCREENS: A[ 1_]
: : i- u .... ± ........
c[p]
LOCATION: PNL F6A8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5030,ME452-0061-4187
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUC_L
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE DESIRED ABORT MODE CANNOT BE SELECTED AND INITIATED USING S1
AND $2 - THE ABORT CAN STILL BE SELECTED AND INITIATE VIA MM601
OR THE OVERiDE DISPLAY
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 _GHEST CRTT_CALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 1804 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSH BUTTON SWITCH FAILED CLOSED OR
ROTARY SWITCH FAILED CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER THAN THE REQUIRED
ABORT MODE.
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT SUBSYS LEAD: L.J. DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmC
1/1
i/1
1/1
i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNLF6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5030, ME452-0061-4187
C[F]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE WRONG ABORT MODE MIGHT BE INITIATED CAUSING LOSS OF VEHCILE
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-140
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
ITEM: ATT REF PB
FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SWITCH CIRCUIT
3) ATT REF PB
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT."
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/!R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
CRiTICALITIES
HDW/_C ABORT
3/2R RTLS:
3/1R TAL:
•/1R - AOA:
3/1R ATO:
B [ P]
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/1R
371R
3/ZR
C [ P ]
LOCATION: PLN F6,F8,A6
PART NUMBER: V_70-710149
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, TEMP, PIECE PART STRU FAIL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. TWO OTHER PUSHBUTTONS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
m
I
I
M
L
m
S
g
i
m
i
m
mm
I
R
mm
J
m
g
I
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-141
Lw
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1902 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: ATT REF PB
FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W.H. SUBSYS LEAD: DRAPELA, LES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SWITCH CIRCUIT
3) ATT REF PB
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PLN F6, F8,A6
VS70-710149
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, TEMP PIECE P_RT STRU FAIL,
RESISTOR OR CONTACT SHORT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE, NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE A CONTINUIOUS UPDATE OF
REF FRAME OR COAS MARK. MAY LOSE COAS FUNCITIONAL CAPABILITY.
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. TWO OTHER REFERENCES AVAILABLE
(INTL, LVLH) FOR ATTITUDE DISPLAY. CREW CAN DESELECT COAS
FUNCTION VIA KYBD.
m
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/15/86 C-142
gMDAC
i01
202
203
304
401
501
5O2
1103
1205
1206
1303
1304
1404
1575
1576
1577
1580
1581
1582
1585
1586
1802
1803
1804
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
RHC
FAILURE MODE
THC
THC
RPTA
SBTC
IMU
IMU
ASA
RJDA
RJDF
ATVC
ATVC
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP
CNTL
_D AUTO PBI
FWD MAN PBI
AFT AUTO/MAN PBIs
NORM/VERN PBIs
(FWD & AFT)
FWD PULSE & DISC
RATE ROT PBIs
AFT PULSE & DISC
RATE ROT PBIs
ACCEL ROT PBIs
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
OF CNTL STICK
IMMOBILE THC
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF ONE RPTA
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF CNTL
LEVER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT
NO POSITION ERR CMD TO ACTR CHN
(NULL OUTPUT)
INADVERTENT JET FIRING
INADVERTENT JET FIRING
NO POSITION CMD TO ACTR CHN (NULL
OUTPUT)
ERRONEOUS POSITION CMD TO ACTR.
BODY FLAP UP/DOWN CMD SWITCH
JAMMED
PBI STUCK IN DEPRSS_D_'_POSITION
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
PSI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
PBI STUCK INDEPRESSED POSITION
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
(FWD & AFT) .................
TRANS PBIs
(FWD & AFT)
ABORT MODE swITCH
_c__ .........
ABORT MODE SWITCH
CIRCUIT
ABORT MODE SWITCH
CIRCUIT
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION
_BORT-MODE_PUSHBUTTORN_ $2
CONTACT FAILED CLOSED
ABORT MODE PUSH BUTTON SWITCH, S2,
FAILED 0PEN OR ROTARY SWITCH, Sl,
FAILED OPEN IN THE POSITION
REQUIRED FOR ABORT
ABORTMODEPUSH BUTTONSWITCH
FAILED CLOSED OR ROTARY SWITCH
FAILED CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER
THAN THE REQUIRED ABORT MODE
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